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ABSTRACT
Current dairy regulations in the U.S. are the result of over 80 years of regulatory 
activities. Through the 1920s and 1930s the U.S. government passed various acts designed to 
increase the share of market surplus captured by sellers, which at the time was judged 
insufficient. Lately, budget constraints and commitments to freer trade agreement have let the 
government and some dairy sector leaders contemplate different levels of dairy deregulation. 
The elimination of the Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMOs), a cornerstone of U.S. dairy 
regulation, has emerged as a possibility.
The thought of eliminating the FMMOs was particularly disturbing to milk producers 
because of uncertainty regarding what might happen to the farm price, the volume of raw milk 
supplied, market stability and price efficiency, and to the distribution of market surplus between 
dairy farmers and dairy processing plants.
These particular questions have not been extensively studied before due to data 
availability problems. Data from the era prior to the establishment of FMMOs would be difficult 
to obtain, and probably not meaningful because FMMOs have been around since the late-1930s.
Experimental economics is used to simulate U.S. dairy market conditions and the effect 
of the elimination of FMMOs. The experimental task is a simple 2 X 2  matrix laboratory game. 
The treatments are oligopsony and regulation. Perishability is represented by an advance 
production decision with no carry-over and is kept constant across the experiments. 
Experimental sessions comprised 12 periods and a practice period. Sellers made production 
decisions and received a pool price, while buyers made a price (bid) and quantity decision. The 
allocation of units produced is made by the monitor on a highest bid basis. The game is 
computer assisted.
Experimental results indicate that, in the absence of regulation, buyers are successful in 
reducing market price below the perfectly competitive price and in capturing a larger share of 
market surplus than a competitive solution predicts. Regulation reduced the market power of 
buyers and the price fluctuation of raw milk, in an oligopsonistic market, and had no significant 
impact on the overall price efficiency of the market.
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I INTRODUCTION
As is the case in most industrialized countries, tflfe U.S. dairy sector is heavily regulated. 
The current dairy regulations in the U.S. are the result of over 80 years of regulatory activities. 
In the early 1900s, the growth of cities, combined with improvements in transportation 
technology and infrastructure encouraged dairy farms to specialize their operations. Similarly, 
dairy processing and distribution activities became more specialized and concentrated. This 
resulted in a few large organized buyers with some degree of market power buying a perishable 
product from many small, unorganized producers.
Through the 1920s and 1930s the U.S. government passed various acts designed to 
increase the share of market surplus captured by sellers. The Capper-Volstead Act of 1921 gave 
the right for farmers to collude and participate in price-setting behavior in a way which 
otherwise would have been a prima facie violation of existing antitrust laws. The formation of 
collective bargaining units (cooperatives) by dairy farmers resulted in mitigated success. Later, 
in the midst of the Great Depression, the federal government passed the Agricultural Marketing 
Agreement Act of 1937. This Act enabled the creation of the Federal Milk Marketing Orders 
(FMMOs), which allow for classified pricing, location price differentials and pooling of 
revenues from milk sales.
Lately, budget constraints and commitments to freer trade agreements have let the 
government and some dairy sector leaders contemplate different levels of dairy deregulation. 
The elimination of FMMOs (deregulation) has emerged as a real possibility.
The thought of eliminating FMMOs was particularly disturbing for the dairy industry 
because of uncertainty regarding what might happen to the farm price, the volume of raw milk 
supplied, market stability, and the distribution of market surplus between dairy farmers and 
dairy processing plants.
These particular questions have not been extensively studied before due to data 
availability problems. Data from the era prior to the establishment of FMMOs would be difficult 
to obtain and would probably not be meaningful because FMMOs have been around since the 
late-1930s. Moreover, dairy experts have been unable to entirely agree on the direction and 
magnitude of the price changes due to deregulation. Some think that the market is fairly 
competitive or would become competitive as cooperatives grew, thus farmers on average should 
receive a price close to, perhaps a bit less than the current regulated price. Others believe that 
buyers are in a situation of oligopsony that cooperatives action cannot mitigate, and thus buyers 
will have market power, pushing farm prices significantly lower.
This paper uses experimental economics to simulate the effects of the elimination of 
FMMOs on farm price, on the volume of raw milk supplied, on the distribution of market 
surplus between dairy farmers (sellers) and dairy processing plants (buyers), on market price 
efficiency, and to some extent, on market stability. The experimental task is a simple 2 X 2  
matrix laboratory game. The treatments are oligopsony and regulation. Perishability is 
represented by advance production decision with no carry-over, and is kept constant across the 
experiments. Perishability is hypothesized to be an important element that impacts the outcome 
of the market, but it exceeds the reach of this research to study it as a treatment. Similarly, the 
organization of sellers into producer cooperatives is not taken into account in the experiment. 
Each experimental session comprised 12 periods and a practice period. Sellers make production 
decisions and receive a pool price, while buyers make a price (bid) and quantity decision. The
1
allocation of the unit produced is made by the monitor on a highest bid basis. The game is 
computer assisted.
»
Experimental results indicate that in the absence of regulation, buyers are successful in 
reducing the market price below the perfectly competitive price and in capturing a larger share of 
market surplus than a competitive solution predicts. Regulation reduces the market power of 
buyers in an oligopsonistic market, has no significant impact on the overall price efficiency of 
the market, and decreases the price fluctuation of raw milk in an oligopsonistic market. 
Although U.S. dairy regulation is an amalgam of different tools and rules, this paper focuses 
only on the elimination of a cornerstone of the U.S. dairy policy, namely the classified pricing 
and pooling scheme used in FMMOs.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section briefly discusses U.S. dairy 
policies, previous studies, the model used, and the hypotheses that are going to be tested. 
Then, the third section translates the real world problem into an experimental market. Finally, a 
discussion of the results of the experiment is followed by the conclusions.
II. THE DAIRY INDUSTRY
2.1. U.S. Dairy Policies
The dairy policies enacted in the 1930s remain largely intact today. The foundation of 
the U.S. dairy program is the support price, FMMOs, and a quota on imports. The government 
does not directly subsidize dairy farmers or support farm prices. Instead, the government sets 
purchase prices for surplus butter, skim milk powder and cheddar cheese. These purchase 
prices include a margin to cover the cost of processing milk so that, on average, dairy farmers 
should receive at least the support price. Price targets under the Dairy Price Support Program 
have been set low enough since 1988 so as to be largely ineffective. The program is presently 
scheduled to be terminated in 1999.
In the U.S. there are two grades of milk: grade A (fluid grade milk) and grade B 
(manufacturing grade milk). FMMOs regulate only grade A milk. Today, more than 70 percent 
of all milk sold to plants and dealers in the U.S. is regulated under Federal Orders and another 
25% is regulated under similar state programs. Given that only 35% of milk sold is needed for 
fluid use in these markets, a significant amount of grade A milk is being used in manufactured 
products (Figure 2.1).
The pricing mechanisms in FMMOs set the minimum prices that regulated plants must 
pay for milk, based on how it is used. So, producers who sell their milk to a plant regulated by
an FMMO all get the same minimum price for their milk through the pooling of receipts1. The 
blend price (minimum price) is a weighted average of the class prices. The weights are based 
on how the milk is used by processors during the month. The final payment that a farmer 
receives is affected by deductions for transportation costs and promotion, and by premiums
1 Variations are allowed for milk composition and transportation costs. In addition, an exception exists for 
members of a cooperative. The rationale is that coops offer services, and thus can offer a price below the blend 
price.
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related to milk components and quality. It should be noted that in the last few years, the market 
price for class III milk has been higher than the support price.
Supply Federal Orders Uses
Grade A ^  Class I ------------ Fluid
Class n  ---------- ► Soft Manufacturing
Class in, and Ilia 
Price Support Program \
Grade B ---------------------------------------------^ Hard Manufacturing
Extracted from Fallert and Blayney, U.S. Dairy Programs. 1990
Figure 2.1 Federal Marketing Orders Categorize Milk According to Use
The regulated monthly price that a class III plant must pay is a base price, equal to the 
so-called Basic Formula Price (BFP) that is announced a month after the transaction month. 
Similarly, a class II plant would pay the BFP + 300 per hundredweight. The BFP employed in 
class II pricing is the one calculated two months prior to the current month. Finally, a class I 
plant would pay the two months old BFP plus its regional class I differential (Figure 2.2). 
Class Ilia milk refers to skim milk used to make skim milk powder. The class Ilia price is 
calculated by a formula largely based on a benchmark wholesale price for bulk skim milk 
powder.
Given that the support price has not played an important role in dairy regulation in the 
last few years, how would the elimination of FMMOs affect milk price?
Because more than 85% of the milk produced in the U.S. is sold through coops, even 
after the elimination of FMMOs it is likely that cooperative will attempt to maintain pooling or 
some form of price equalization across members. However, the mandatory 300 over class III 
price, and the mandatory class I price differential would not exist anymore, and it is far from 
clear whether cooperatives would be able to maintain price differentials in these markets. These 
new conditions are likely to affect milk prices and the distribution of market surplus between 
sellers and buyers of raw milk.
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Price Support Progam 
Support price for rrilk
l
Support purchase prices for 
dairy products
l
Wholesale prices for 
manufactured dairy products
l
Milk Marketing Orders
Price for manufacturing rrilk 
equals
Basic Fornula Price
Price for manufacturing rrilk ■
Modified from Fallert and Blavnev. U.S. Dairy Programs. 1990
BFP Class III price
►BFP + 30 cents = 
Class II price
BFP + differential = 
Class I price
Figure 2.2 The Basic Formula Price Links the Price Support Program and 
Marketing Orders
2.2 Literature Review
A short review of literature shows that even though the U.S. dairy sector has been 
extensively studied, no study that looks directly at the impact of deregulation on the market price 
of milk and on the market surplus distribution between plants and farmers was found. Most 
related studies have taken a look at the cost of regulation, at the possible structure of an 
unregulated market, or at cases of sellers market power within the regulatory environment.
The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) estimated the impact of the 
elimination of all dairy programs on the dairy sector. Their model comprises over 70 behavioral 
equations and identities plus an additional 100 equations that provide regional dairy cost of 
production estimates. However, price surfaces that would exist without FMMO and that are 
necessary to conduct their analysis came from a panel of dairy experts. According to FAPRI, 
their analysis is extremely sensitive to the exogenous milk prices needed for their analysis. 
“These assumptions are extremely important in setting the stage for the subsequent analysis. I f  
a different set o f differentials were assumed to exist, the regional differences that show up under 
this run would be different" (FAPRI, April 1995). The expert panel believed price differentials 
would decline, consequently FAPRI results show a significant decrease of milk price at the 
farm, a lower level of production and a sharp decrease in the number of dairy cows.
MacAvoy (1977) reports the result of a study made by the Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division staff on a phased deregulation of milk marketing. A computer simulation of 
dairy deregulation resulted in a price decrease (3%) of farm milk used for fluid and a price 
increase (5%) of farm milk used for manufacture. However, the study assumes a perfectly 
competitive deregulated market for raw milk.
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Ippolito and Masson (1978) estimated the costs and efficiencies of dairy regulation using 
a price equilibrium model. According to their study, dairy regulations create many inefficiencies 
and are rather costly. The study did not clearly estimate the benefits of regulation. Moreover, 
they implicitly assume that unregulated markets are perfect; hence a regulated market by 
definition must be sub-optimal.
Suzuki et al., (1993) built an econometric model of imperfect competition which, 
according to the authors, better estimated the effects of deregulation than the models of perfect 
competition economists traditionally use. However, this study did not assess the level of 
competitiveness between farmers and buyers. Instead, the demonstration, through comparison 
of alternative models, has been made that a state of perfect competition will not exist in an 
unregulated market.
From the literature it seems that dairy economists agree on the fact that the current 
structure of the U.S. dairy market is not perfectly competitive. However, disagreements on the 
source or type of imperfect competition have been observed. According to Masson and 
DeBrock (1980) "The milk industry ... is far from competitive ... due in part to locational 
factors and in part to a vast network of federal and state governmental regulations and control ." 
From this citation it can be inferred that regulations move the dairy industry away from perfect 
competition. However, in testimony on federal dairy policy Novakovic (1995) wrote "Farm 
level milk markets are not models o f perfect competition. They are inherently oligopsonistic in 
nature, meaning buyers generally have the ability to dictate price." If an unregulated dairy, 
market is oligopsonistic, it can be inferred that regulation tries to correct market imperfection 
inherent to the sector. On the other hand, if an unregulated market behaves close to the model 
of pure competition, regulation then only creates market distortions to the detriment of buyers.
A laboratory experiment allows for the collection of data in a controlled environment. 
Thus, the use of exogenous and subjective data into models is avoided. The effects of 
interrelated variables and confounding extraneous factors that plague econometric analyses are 
also reduced to a minimum. Given the long history of regulation and the numerous structural 
shocks that characterized the dairy sector, experimental economics appears to be appropriate to 
study the impact of deregulation on farm price, on the volume of raw milk supplied, on the 
distribution of market surplus between dairy farmers and dairy processing plants, and on market 
price efficiency.
2.3 Theory and Hypotheses
In this sub-section, general theoretical concepts are briefly reviewed. Then, based on 
these concepts a simple dairy market model is developed, followed by a description of the 
hypotheses that were tested in the experiment.
2.3.1 Theory
The model of pure competition is defined by the following four characteristics (Millman,
1996):
1- Many firms and many consumers;
2- No single firm is big enough to affect price;
3- Standardized product;
4- Easy entry and exit of firms.
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The model of pure competition is important not because it describes much of the real world, but 
because it is a normative model of efficiency and equity. Agricultural markets are often cited in 
textbooks as being near to pure competition.
The market for raw milk is not likely to be one of pure competition. First, the condition 
of many sellers (dairy farmers) and many buyers (dairy processing plants) is violated. In the 
U.S. there are roughly 100 dairy farms for each processing dairy plant, and this ratio has 
generally increased over time. Even when coops are taken into account, the number of sellers
still far outweighs the number of plants at the national level2. This is all the more true when one 
recognizes that many plants have the same owners. Another point that affects the market for 
raw milk and that is not explicitly stated in the conditions of pure competition is the high degree 
of perishability of raw milk. Because a firm faces a total loss if units produced are not sold or 
consumed in a given period of time, that firm is more at the mercy of buyers than a firm that 
could store its output, at little cost, and offer it at a more opportune time.
Thus, perishability and the oligopsonistic characteristic of the raw milk market probably 
give dairy processors a certain degree of market power. Market power is broadly defined as the 
ability to influence the price of a product or a resource. In game theory terms, equilibrium 
market power exists if there is a non-cooperative equilibrium that results in supra-competitive 
price.
2.3.2 Dairy Market Model
In a simplified way, the U.S. dairy market contains two types of demand for raw milk. 
A demand for raw milk used in the processing of milk beverage and cream (herein called Type I 
demand), and a demand for raw milk used in the processing of manufactured dairy products 
such as cheese, ice cream, yogurt, butter and powder (Type II). Type I demand is presumed 
relatively inelastic, while Type II demand is less inelastic than Type I demand. The “type” 
categorization used for this research obviously relates to the classes used in federal orders. It 
has been taken for granted in dairy markets that consumer demand for beverage milk (class I) is 
more inelastic than the demand for manufactured products (classe II, III, and Ilia), and 
numerous studies suggest this (Ippolito and Masson, 1978). Moreover, price discrimination in 
federal orders would fail to enhance producer prices if this were not true. The difference in 
elasticity is mostly explained by the different degree of perishability of the two product 
categories. Contrary to manufactured dairy products, milk beverages have to be consumed 
within a few days after their exit from the plant. Therefore, milk beverage processing plants 
have a more inelastic demand for raw milk than manufactured dairy product plants. The supply 
curve for raw milk is inelastic. This inelasticity stems from the fixed asset structure of dairy 
farms, and the high degree of perishability of raw milk. In a situation of pure or perfect 
competition, the summation of Type I demand (DI) and Type II demand (DII) would make up 
the total demand (Dt) (Figure 2.3). It is the intersection of the supply curve (S) and the total 
demand curve that will result in the perfectly competitive equilibrium price (P*) and quantity 
(Qt*), assuming no additional, confounding transaction costs (Figure 2.3). Although, the 
model of pure competition might not be perfectly appropriate to describe the raw milk market, it 
is nevertheless an important benchmark in terms of price, quantity, and price efficiency.
2 Although concentration of producer cooperatives at the national level is not extremely high, concentration in 
some local markets is.
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FMMOs affect the market of raw milk by price discriminating between Type I and Type 
II demand. Type I buyers are asked to pay a higher price for raw milk than Type II buyers. A 
pooled price is returned to all the farmers in the following way :
p , _ PIQi + PHQi
Q\ +Qi
where P' is the pooled price. PI and PII are Type I and Type II buyer's price, respectively. Qi 
and Q2 are the quantities of raw milk sold at the Type I price and Type II price, respectively.
It can be observed from Figure 2.3 that classified pricing creates a new demand curve 
(average revenue) Dp. Dp is at the right of the total demand curve of the model of pure 
competition (Dt) as long as DI is more inelastic than DII. The effect is a higher equilibrium 
price P'>P* and a larger equilibrium quantity Qt’>Qt*. The difference between PI and PII is 
called the differential (DF). The major role of the orders is to ensure that the differential is 
respected by the plants.
By their price discrimination scheme, FMMOs are subsidizing the Type II buyers to the 
detriment of the Type I buyers. In the process, a larger share of the perfectly competitive total 
surplus is transferred to sellers. Thus, if one believe that the unregulated raw milk market is 
close to the model of pure competition, regulation then acts as a device that transfers wealth 
from the buyers to the sellers without any economic justification. In a sense, it confers 
monopoly power to the seller. On the other hand, if one believes that buyers have a sufficient 
degree of market power to permit oligopsonistic behavior, then regulation could be seen as a 
corrective device that ensures that sellers and buyers get a surplus share more consistent with 
pure competition.
Figure 2.3 Illustration of the Regulated Market for Raw Milk
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In order to shed some light on the effect of regulation on the surplus allocation between 
sellers and buyers, two demand curves and a supply curve were constructed for the purpose of 
the experiment (Figure 2.4). Following the methodology used in many experiments, discrete 
curves were used.
In the experiments, the same industry supply and demand curves are kept constant. The 
supply curve is allocated among sellers in a way such that each seller has a similar marginal cost 
curve. The Type I (less inelastic) and Type II (inelastic) demand curves are similarly allocated 
between Type I and Type II buyers3. In the model of pure competition the summation of the 
two demand curves would result in the industry demand curve (^Demand). The industry
demand and supply curves intersect at a price of 400 francs and at 21 units4.
In the regulated environment, the use of a differential of 266 francs results in a regulated 
demand curve (^Pooled). The supply curve intersects the regulated demand curve at a price of 
495 francs and at 24 units.
To assess the impact of the treatment variables (regulation and oligopsony), the model of 
pure competition is often used as a benchmark. Although the model of pure competition does 
not make any distinction between storable and perishable goods, previous studies such as 
Mestelman, and Welland (1988 and 1990) show evidence that market price efficiency and the 
distribution of surplus among sellers and buyers is affected by the presence of perishability. In 
general, these results suggest that sellers are disadvantaged when perishability exists. Note that 
perishability is present and constant across all treatments of the experiment. This is expected to 
impact the outcomes, but it is not specifically measured as a treatment. •
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3 Note that Type I buyers in the experiment represent Type II buyers in the FMMOs, and vice versa. The change 
was made at the request of subjects in experimental pretests.
4 In the experiment, “francs” are used to denote the players’ currency.
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2.3.3 Hypotheses
From Figure 2.3 it can be seen that regulation shifts the total demand curve to the right 
(from Dt to Dp). In theory, relative to the perfectly competitive equilibrium, this shift results in 
higher market price, more unit traded, and a larger share of market surplus for sellers. That 
leads to the following hypotheses.
H la: Regulation increases market prices.
H lb: Regulation increases the quantity traded.
H lc: Regulation increases the percentage of the competitive sellers’ surplus 
captured by sellers. .
According to economic theory, the presence of oligopsony decreases market prices, the 
number of units traded, and the percentage of sellers’ surplus captured by sellers, all relative to 
the model of pure competition.
H2a: A reduction in the number of buyers decreases market price
H2b: A reduction in the number of buyers decreases the quantity traded
H2c: A reduction in the number of buyers decreases the percentage of the
competitive sellers’ surplus captured by sellers .
Using the theoretical prediction behind the previous two sets of hypothesis, we see that 
the oligopsony and the regulation treatments are hypothesized to be diametrically opposed. 
Does the combination of these two treatments partially cancel each other? In order to shed some 
light on the more specific question; “Can regulation mitigate the market imperfection of the dairy 
market?” (assuming the existence of an oligopsonistic market), the following hypotheses are 
tested.
H3a: Oligopsony has less effect on market prices with the presence of 
regulation than without regulation.
H3b: Oligopsony has less effect on the percentage of competitive sellers’ 
surplus captured by sellers with the presence of regulation than 
without regulation.
Economists, in general, believe that most forms of regulation are a hindrance to 
efficiency (e.g., Ippolito and Masson, 1978). The model of pure competition is, in theory, 
perfectly efficient. Efficiency will then be measured as the total surplus captured over the total 
surplus available in the model of pure competition. This leads to a fourth testable hypothesis:
H4: Regulation reduces the overall price efficiency of the market.
One argument often used by dairy regulators to justify their existence is that regulation 
decreases price variability. “Federal milk orders ... facilitates orderly marketing. Orders ...
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correct conditions of price instability and needless fluctuations in price.” (USDA, 1989). This 
hypothesis will be tested using the price variance and a measure of price deviation.
H5: Regulation increases market price stability.
III. THE EXPERIMENT
To test the hypotheses previously formulated, an experiment was designed. The 
experiment allows for variation in the number of buyers (oligopsony) and for the presence or 
absence of regulation. In this section the nature of die experiment is described, as well as the 
specific feature of the markets. A discussion of how the experimental.design improves the 
power of the experiment, and minimize the chances that “nuisance variables” might interfere 
with the interpretation of the results concludes this section.
As a preliminary, the following definitions should be noted. A cohort is a group of ten 
or seven subjects who participated in the same trading sessions. A period amounts to one 
trading decision by each player and to the outcome of these decisions. A session is a 50 to 90 
minute interval of trading activity and is made up of 12 trading periods plus a practice trading 
period. The combination of all the sessions makes up the experiment.
3.1 Trader Types
In order to simulate the market for raw milk, subjects in each 'cohort are randomly 
assigned to one of the following roles: seller, Type I buyer, or Type II buyer.
Sellers make advance production decisions in each period, and receive the average 
market price. There is no carry-over for units produced. Thus, if a unit has been produced but 
is not sold, that unit is lost and the seller still incurs the production cost. This represents the 
perishability effect inherent to the raw milk market.
Type I buyers are low-value buyers and face an inelastic demand curve. These buyers 
simulate the manufactured or class III buyers in the market for raw milk. Finally, Type II 
buyers are high-value buyers and have the means to outbid the Type I buyers at any time. Type 
II buyers face a highly inelastic demand curve. They are the representation of fluid milk or class 
I buyers in the market for raw milk.
Buyers (Type I and Type II) have to make a quantity and a bid decision in each period. 
All the units bought in a single period by a single buyer have to be bought at her bid price.
3.2 Trading Rules
With Regulation
In this simulated market two levels of price classification exist, which is a simplification 
from the current market for raw milk. Having two levels of price classification instead of three 
or even four does not alter the results because it maintains the principle of price discrimination 
between different demand elasticity, which is the core of regulation.
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In the regulated market sellers have first to make a production decision based on their 
own price expectation. Then each Type I buyer (low-value) makes a bid and a quantity 
decision. A minimum bid for Type II buyers is then computed. The minimum bid is the 
weighted average of the previous period realized transaction for low-value buyers, plus a
constant5.
The constant represents the class I differential and was chosen to be at 266 francs (an
experimental currency) for the experiment6. A differential of 266 francs allows for a significant 
spread in price between treatments, and is within the industry historical range of differential 
relative to the predicted price.
Type II buyers must then bid at a price greater or equal to the announced minimum bid 
price. Using a computer program the monitor then makes the allocation for the units that have 
been produced. Three scenarios can occur: 1- supply equals demand; 2- excess demand; 3- 
excess supply.
In the first scenario, sellers sell all their production and buyers get all the units asked for 
at their respective bid. The second scenario implies that sellers sell all their production but that 
not all buyers get the number of units that they ask for. The allocation is made by the monitor 
on a highest bid basis. Therefore the buyers with the lowest bid get only a part of the units 
asked (residual supply), or no unit at all. In the third scenario buyers get all the units that they 
ask for, but some sellers do not sell all their production. Sellers are randomly chosen to decide 
who starts selling first. However, to avoid that the random effect plays an important role in the 
decision process of sellers, sellers sell one unit at the time. This means that the first seller 
picked sells her first unit first, then the first unit of the second seller picked is allocated, and so 
on. Then we move to the second unit for the first seller picked, and the process continues until 
total demand is fulfilled. Sellers who did not sell all their units still incur the cost of producing 
these units. "
The monitor then announces the results of the allocation as well as the final weighted 
price for the sellers. The final weighted price is the summation of the quantity bought by each 
buyer multiplied by their bid and divided by the total unit bought in the period. Subjects then 
enter the information that concerns their decision on their computer and get their net earnings for 
the period. All sellers get the same price, while buyers pay their individual bid. The trade 
sequence, although a simplification, contains the major traits of FMMOs.
To reflect the regulatory process, after each period, prices, the bid and quantity 
decisions of each buyer, the production decision of each seller, as well as the allocation process 
are displayed on the board, and made common knowledge. However, players know only their 
own cost or their own value structure. The role of each subject (seller, low-value buyer, high- 
value buyer) is also common knowledge.
Subjects are also told at the beginning of each experiment that the monitor has the right 
to refuse a bid if the bid is considered too low. In order to avoid anchoring problems, the floor 
bid is not divulged to the players. If a bid is too low, the bidder will be asked privately to 
resubmit a bid, and not to bid below 200 francs. This could be seen as corresponding to the
5 For the first period the minimum bid is computed using realized transaction of Type I buyers in the practice 
period.
6 The use of an experimental currency allows to scale the experiment as needed, while always using round 
numbers for trading. Francs are converted to U.S $ at the end of each session.
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price support level, although 200 francs is an extremely low price (only half of the predicted 
equilibrium price in pure competition).
Without Regulation
Without regulation the trading rules are the same with the exception that the differential 
is then 0 and that Type II buyers have no minimum bid constraint. Thus, Type I and Type II 
buyers bid at the same time and compete directly against one another. Sellers still get a 
weighted price and buyers pay their bid. The way units are allocated is also the same.
3.3 Subjects and Incentives
Subjects were undergraduate students at the University of Arizona, Tucson. Each 
subject was part of a cohort and participated in two sessions over two days. A subject could not 
be in two different cohorts. Subjects in the experiment made different amounts of money based 
on their market performance, their incentive is therefore to earn the most money they can.
Sellers made money by selling units at a price that was higher than the cost of each unit. 
Individual low-cost units had to be sold before high-cost ones, thus each seller faced increasing 
marginal cost (MC). Because sellers made their decision before knowing what the market price 
was going to be, they had to anticipate the future price based on the history of the game. Sellers 
should produce where MC = expected price.
Buyers made money by buying units at a price below the value of each unit. Individual 
high-value units had to be bought before the low-value ones, thus buyers faced decreasing 
marginal value (MV). Buyers made one bid for all the units that they wanted to buy, therefore 
buyers should buy at MV = bid.
Each type of player was expected to make an average between $25 and $35 including 
show-up fees for the two-day experiments (total duration two to 2.5 hours). To convert the 
francs, the experimental currency used, into U.S. dollars the following exchange rates were 
used.
Seller 
Buyer I 
Buyer II
F * 0.00075 
F * 0.0020 
F * 0.00045
F * 0.00075 
F * 0.0020 
F * 0.00045
F * 0.001 
F * 0.0009 
F *  0.00015
F * 0.001 
F * 0.0009 
F * 0.00015
Because the role that a subject played could greatly affect her earnings in francs, 
different exchange rates were allocated for each role. This way, equity relative to potential 
earnings in U.S. dollars was reestablished between subjects. The same reason explains the 
differences in exchange rate between the oligopsony and the no-oligopsony sessions. 
Participants knew their own exchange rate before the start of the game, and were told orally 
about the equity factor of exchange rates.
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To conduct the experiment, six groups of ten subjects and six groups of seven subjects 
were recruited. The groups of ten subjects were assigned to cohorts seven to twelve (C7 to 
C12), while the groups of seven subjects were assigned to cohorts one to six (Cl to C6). As 
shown in Figure 3.1, each cohort is assigned to two sessions (over a two-day period), and the 
two sessions differed in treatment. Moreover, the order in which different cohorts traded was 
reversed. So, half of the cohort started with one treatment while the other half started with the 
other treatment.
3.4 Experimental Design Issues
OLIGOPSONY
session 1
R
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I
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N
YES
session II
session I
NO
session II
YES «________________ NO
C ll
C21
C31
C42
C52
C62
C71
C81
C91
Cl 02 
C l 12 
C122
C41 C101
C51 c m
C61 C121 .
C12 C72
C22 C82
C32 C92
Figure 3.1 Experimental Design
Figure 3.2 shows how treatments differ. The oligopsony treatment results from a 
reduction in the total number of buyers (from six to three). Thus experiments with oligopsony 
needed only seven subjects instead of the ten subjects. For the regulation treatment the 
differential (DF) goes from 0 to 266 and Type II buyers are constrained by a minimum bid.
The experimental design (Figure 3.1) serves several purposes. First it controls for 
differences across cohorts. It is known that different subjects in laboratory markets possess 
different levels of intelligence, motivation and familiarity with the experimental environment 
(Kagel and Roth (1995), Davis and Holt (1992)). Such differences can make it more difficult to 
draw inferences about the effect of a treatment variable if one cohort of subject trades in one 
setting and another group trades in another setting. In such a case, the treatment might actually 
reflect differences in the cohorts’ skill or motivation, more observation would then be required 
to isolate the treatment effect. The best way to avoid this problem is to have all subjects trade in 
every cell of the design. However, in this particular design it would have been difficult to have 
people come back for four days (instead of two). As an added problem the number of subjects 
was not perfectly balanced between treatments. The second best solution was to have subjects
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participate in half of the cells of the design. For example, cohort 1_ participates in the 
oligopsony-regulation cell first (Cl 1), then in the oligopsony-no regulation cell (C l2) (Figure 
3.1). The number of sessions in each cell was also increased to compensate for the not 
perfectly repeated design.
Oligopsony
YES NO
# seller | # buyer I | # buyer II # seller |# buyer I |# buyer II
R
e
g
u
1
a
t
i
0
n
YES
DF = 266
4 2 1 4 3 3
NO 
DF = 0
<
4 2 1 4 3 .3
DF: Price differential
Figure 3.2 Treatments Design
The design also controls for the order effects. Because laboratory markets are complex, 
even a single cohort may behave differently in later repetitions of the task than in early 
repetitions (Forsythe and Lundholm (1990)). This effect is controlled by varying the order in 
which different cohorts trade. For example, cohorts 1 to 3 trade in the oligopsony-regulation 
cell, then in the oligopsony-no regulation cell. In contrast, cohorts 4 to 6 trade first in the 
oligopsony-no regulation cell then in the oligopsony-regulation cell. .
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
4.1 The Effect of Regulation and Oligopsony on Price and Quantity Traded
By the nature of the market simulated, only one price—the weighted price—is generated 
in each period of the experiment. The analysis will also concentrate on the total quantity traded.
Panel A of Table 4.1 shows that regulation increases the average market price, which is 
consistent with H1A. The panel also shows that oligopsony or the reduction in the number of 
buyers has no effect on price in a regulated world. On the other hand, oligopsony decreases 
market price in the absence of regulation. This is consistent with H2a and H3a.
To assess the statistical significance of these effects, the dependence of the data must 
first be addressed. Each period in the experiment gives us one data point for each variable of 
interest. The 24 sessions that composed the experiment are made of 12 periods, excluding a 
practice period. This yielded 288 observations for each dependent variable. In order to reduce
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#the impact of the learning effects, only the last six periods of each session were kept7. Thus, 
144 observations were left. '
The 144 observations of the dependent variables are not independent because each 
subject is assigned to a cohort, which trades in two sessions. This dependance is accounted for 
by using a “repeated-measures” ANOVA to assess the effects of the experiment treatments. For 
the purpose of the statistical analysis, a period is considered a repeated treatment, as well as 
regulation (as defined earlier). Oligopsony is not a repeated-measure in the experiment. A 
repeated-measures ANOVA compares the explanatory power of each repeated variable to the 
explanatory power of that variable’s interaction with the “cohort” variable. For example, as 
shown in Panel B of Table 4.1, regulation accounts for a mean sum of squares of 194,628. In 
contrast, the regulation x cohort interaction explains a sum of squares of only 3,127 (per degree 
of freedom). Thus, the effect of regulation is robust across cohorts, and therefore is significant 
at the 0.0001 level. The effect of oligopsony and the regulation x oligopsony interaction are
also statistically significant at the 0.0315 and 0.068 levels (one-tail test)8..
The repeated-measures ANOVA allows for the determination of the degree of statistical 
significance for the treatment variables, and to look at the different interaction between those 
variables. However, a contrast analysis is needed to assess the degree of statistical significance 
between one pair of treatments and another. To perform the contrast analysis, we use two 
repeated-measures ANOVA wherein each run keeps one of the treatment variables constant at a 
time. For example, Panel C of Table 4.1 shows that in the absence of oligopsony, the increase 
in price that results from regulation is significant at the 0.0018 level. Regulation also 
significantly increases price in the presence of oligopsony. On the other hand, the same panel 
shows that in a regulated world, a reduction in the number of buyers has no significant impact 
on price, but has a significant impact in the absence of regulation.
Next, the effects on the quantity of units traded are examined. Panel A of Table 4.2 
indicates that regulation increases the number of units traded, as expected from the mathematical 
model and in accordance with H lb. It also appears that the presence of oligopsony slightly 
reduces quantity traded, even more so with regulation. According to theory, oligopsony would 
have the effect of reducing the number of units traded.
Panels B and C of Table 4.2 show that the effects of regulation on quantity traded are 
statistically significant. In contrast, oligopsony has no statistically significant effect on the 
number of units traded, which does not support H2b. However, we can see that the results are 
going in the direction predicted by theory, but we can not say with great certainty (due to low 
statistical significance) that the decrease in quantity is due to a reduction in the number of 
buyers.
7 The statistical analysis shows the presence of a “period” or learning effect when all the periods are used. This 
effect mostly disappeared when the last six periods are used. However, this change does not affect the direction of 
the results, but statistical significance is improved.
8 Unless specified otherwise, all statistical tests are two-tailed test. In this case a one-tail test is appropriate 
because the results are conformed to the hypotheses.
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Table 4.1 The Effect of Regulation and Oligopsony on Market Clearing Price
Panel A displays the effect of regulation on market clearing price in oligopsony and no­
oligopsony settings. Panel B reports the two-tailed P-values of a 3-way ANOVA with repeated- 
measures on two factors (period and regulation). Panel C reports the two-tailed P-value of the 
contrast analysis (repeated-measures ANOVA with one treatment variable kept constant at the 
time).
3anel A: Plot of Market Clearing Price_______
C learing Price
3anel B: Statistical Results from a Repeated-Measures ANOVA
Source DF SS MS F Value Prob > F
Oligopsony 1 7511 7511 4.37 0.0631
Cohort 10 17189 1719
Regulation 1 194628 194628 62.25 0.0001
01igopsony*Regulation 1 8220 8220 2.63 0.1360
Regulation*Cohort 10 31265 3127
Period 5 2954 591 1.02 0.4162
01igopsony*Period 5 2659 532 0.92 0.4773
Period*Cohort 50 28969 579
Regulation*Period 5 2506 501 0.45 0.8103
Regulation*01igopsony*Period 5 7548 1510
Regulation*Period*Cohort 50 55526 1111
143 358975
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Table 4.1 (Continued)
3anel C: Statistical Results from Contrast Analyses
Contrast F Value Prob > F
Effect of regulation 
without oligopsony 36.37 0.0018
Effect of regulation 
with oligopsony 30.99 0.0026
Effect of oligopsony 
with regulation 0.00 0.9479
Effect of oligopsony 
without regulation 5.14 0.0468
Table 4.2 The Effect of Regulation and Oligopsony on Quantity Traded
Panel A displays the effect of regulation on quantity traded in oligopsony and no­
oligopsony settings. Panel B reports the two-tailed P-values of a 3-way ANOVA with repeated- 
measures on two factors (period and regulation). Panel C reports the two-tailed P-value of the 
contrast analysis (repeated-measures ANOVA with one treatment variable kept constant at the 
time). _____ ______
3anel A: Plot of Quantity Traded_________________
Quantity traded
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Table 4.2 (Continued)
3anel B: Statistical Results from a Repeated-Measures ANOVA
Source DF SS MS F Value Prob > F
Oligopsony 1 3.67 3.67 1.96 0.1917
Cohort 10 18.74 1.874
Regulation 1 184.51 184.51 21.49 0.0009
01igopsony*Regulation 1 1.56 1.56 0.18 0.6787
Regulation*Cohort 10 85.85 8.585
Period 5 30.7 6.14 1.72 0.1462
01igopsony*Period 5 13.53 2.706 0.76 0.5827
Period*Cohort 50 178.01 3.5602
Regulation*Period 5 24.37 4.874 0.95 0.4544
Regulation*01igopsony*Period 5 6.98 1.396
Regulation*Period*Cohort 50 255.24 5.1048
143 803.16
Janel C: Statistical Results from Contrast Analyses
Contrast F Value Prob > F
Effect of regulation 
without oligopsony 13.67 0.0140
Effect of regulation 
with oligopsony 8.34 0.0343
Effect of oligopsony 
with regulation 1.22 0.2955
Effect of oligopsony 
without regulation 0.04 0.8553
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4.2 The Effect of Regulation and Oligopsony on Market Price Efficiency and
on Surplus Distribution
Market surplus is the summation of the sellers’ surplus and the buyers’ surplus. The 
sellers’ surplus is the area that is above the supply curve and below the equilibrium price, while 
the buyers’ surplus is the area that is below the demand curve and above the equilibrium price. 
Price efficiency is defined, for the purpose of the study, as the surplus extracted by the trading 
agents divided by the maximum possible surplus. The maximum possible surplus extracted is 
computed using the model of pure competition (Figure 2.4). A measure of market price 
efficiency is computed for each period.
An important measure of surplus distribution is the percentage of the competitive sellers’ 
surplus captured by sellers (sSurplus%), and the percentage of the competitive buyers’ surplus 
captured by buyers (bSurplus%). However, these measures are not appropriate to make 
comparisons across sessions because of their correlation with price efficiency. For example, if 
the level of price efficiency rises in a given period, the sSurplus% and bSurplus% will also 
increase. In order to eliminate the variation of sSurplus% and bSurplus% due to variation in the 
level of price efficiency, sSurplus% and bSurplus% are divided by their respective level of price 
efficiency. The variables obtained are Net Seller Welfare = Surplus%/price efficiency and Net 
Buyer Welfare = bSurplus%/price efficiency. .
It can be seen from Panel A of Table 4.3 that regulation seems to increase market price 
efficiency, especially with the presence of oligopsony. Oligopsony also appears to reduce price 
efficiency in die absence of regulation. However, Panel B of Table 4.3 indicates that neither 
oligopsony nor regulation has a statistically significant effect on market price efficiency. 
Although Panel A suggests that regulation in an oligopsonistic world and oligopsony in an 
unregulated world affect market price efficiency, the contrast analysis confirms the lack of 
statistically significant effects (Panel C, Table 4.3). Thus, H4 is rejected; regulation does not 
reduce the price efficiency of the market.
Panel A of Table 4.4 shows that regulation increases Net Seller Welfare (sWelfare), in 
accordance with Hlc. It also shows that the presence of oligopsony reduces sWelfare (H2c) 
and that the reduction is stronger in the absence of regulation (H3b).
Panel B of Table 4.4 indicates that the effects of regulation and of oligopsony are 
significant. It also shows a period effect statistically significant at the 0.0755 level. As the 
session progresses sellers are able to increase sWelfare. This seems to indicate that some 
learning effects are still taking place for this variable. However, additional analysis suggests 
that the presence of statistical significance (at the 0.0755 level) reflects peculiar characteristics of 
the data, rather than the presence of an effect. When the analysis is done over the 12 periods of 
each session the period effect is rejected for sWelfare. Moreover, if the analysis is done over 
the last four periods of each session, the period effect is also rejected.
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Table 4.3 The Effect of Regulation and Oligopsony on Market Price Efficiency
Panel A displays the effect of regulation on market price efficiency in oligopsony and 
no-oligopsony settings. Price efficiency is defined as the market surplus extracted by the
trading agents divided by the total market surplus9. Panel B reports the two-tailed P-values of a 
3-way ANOVA with repeated-measures on two factors (period and regulation). Panel C reports 
the two-tailed P-value of the contrast analysis (repeated-measures ANOVA with one treatment 
variable kept constant at the time).____________ ________•_________ - ■ .. ■.■■ v
Panel A: Plot of Market Price Efficiency
Efficiency
*
4
OrO
L.«p
a.
"Oligopsony 
"No oligopsony
Regu la t  ion
3anel B: Statistical Results from a Repeated-Measures ANOVA
Source DF SS MS F Value Prob > F
Oligopsony 1 0.0492 0.0492 1.77 0.2127
Cohort 10 0.2779 0.0278
Regulation 1 0.0672 0.0672 2.07 0.1809
Oligopsony ’"Regulation 1 0.0564 0.0564 1.74 0.2166
Regulation *Cohort 10 0.3247 0.0325
Period 5 0.0386 0.0077 0.85 0.5216
Oligopsony *Period 5 0.0157 0.0031 0.35 0.8833
Period*Cohort 50 0.4550 0.0091
Regulation*Period 5 0.0291 0.0058 0.59 0.7094
Regulation*01igopsony*Period 5 0.0174 0.0035
Regulation *Period*Cohort 50 0.4954 0.0099
143 1.8266
Total market surplus is defined by the area that is above the supply curve and below the demand curve.
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Table 4.3 (Continued)
3anel C: Statistical Results from Contrast Analyses
Contrast F Value Prob > F
Effect of regulation 
without oligopsony 0.02 0.8958
Effect of regulation 
with oligopsony 2.34 0.1867
Effect of oligopsony 
with regulation 0.05 0.8341
Effect of oligopsony 
without regulation 1.83 0.2055
Table 4.4 The Effect of Regulation and Oligopsony on sWelfare
Panel A displays the effect of regulation on sWelfare in oligopsony and no-oligopsony 
settings. sWelfare is defined as the percentage of the competitive sellers’ surplus captured by 
sellers divided by market price efficiency. Panel B reports the two-tailed P-values of a 3-way 
ANOVA with repeated-measures on two factors (period and regulation). Panel C reports the 
two-tailed P-value of the contrast analysis (repeated-measures ANOVA with one treatment 
variable kept constant at the time). _____  -_____
Panel A: Plot of sWelfare
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Table 4.4 (Continued)
Panel B: Statistical Results from a Repeated-Measures ANOVA
Source DF SS MS F Value Prob > F
Oligopsony 1 0.4304 0.4304 5.30 0.0440
Cohort 10 0.8115 0.0812
Regulation 1 7.1253 7.1253 56.50 0.0001
01igopsony*Regulation 1 0.1451 0.1451 1.15 0.3086
Regulation*Cohort 10 1.2611 0.1261
Period 5 0.5425 0.1085 2.14 0.0755
01igopsony*Period 5 0.2434 0.0487 0.96 0.4505
Period*Cohort 50 2.5323 0.0506
Regulation*Period 5 0.1436 0.0287 0.30 0.9099
Regulation*01igopsony*Period 5 0.4441 0.0888
Regulation*Period*Cohort 50 4.7697 0.0954
143 18.4490
3anel C: Statistical Results from Contrast Analyses
Contrast F Value Prob > F
Effect of regulation 
without oligopsony 50.71 0.0008
Effect of regulation 
with oligopsony 23.19 0.0048
Effect of oligopsony 
with regulation 0.45 0.5154
Effect of oligopsony 
without regulation 4.33 0.0640
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The contrast analysis (Panel C of Table 4.4) confirms that in all settings regulation 
significantly increases sWelfare. Further evidence that regulation mitigates the effects of 
oligopsony on surplus allocation is given. Thus, with regulation, a reduction in the number of 
buyers has no statistically significant effect. On the other hand, in the absence of regulation, a 
reduction in the number of buyers significantly (statistically) reduces sWelfare.
Next, we want to assess the impact of the treatment variables on Net Buyer Welfare 
(bWelfare). Because we respectively divided sSurplus% and bSurplus% by price efficiency to 
obtain sWelfare and bWelfare, a loss in sWelfare will be reflected in an equal gain in bWelfare. 
Thus, Panels B and C of Table 4.5 are identical to their counterpart in Table 4.4, but this time, 
the effect is in the opposite direction.
Panel A of Table 4.5 shows that regulation decreases bWelfare. It also shows that the 
presence of oligopsony increases bWelfare, according to H2c, and that the increase is stronger 
in the absence of regulation (H3b).
Panel B of Table 4.5 indicates that the effects of regulation and of oligopsony are 
significant. As for Panel B of Table 4.4 a period effect is detected at the 0.0755 level (see the 
previous discussion). Panel C of Table 4.5 confirms that in all settings regulation significantly 
decreases bWelfare. With regulation, a reduction in the number of buyers has no statistically 
significant effect. On the other hand, in the absence of regulation, a reduction in the number of 
buyers significantly (statistically) increases bWelfare.
Another way to look at the impact of regulation and oligopsony on the distribution of 
surplus is to compare the sSurplus% and the bSurplus% in a single cell of the design. One 
would expect to see no statistically significant difference between sSurplus% and bSurplus% in 
a perfectly competitive environment. Also, to see regulation significantly (statistically) increases 
the difference in favor of the sSurplus%, and to see oligopsony significantly (statistically) 
increases the difference in favor of the bSurplus%. The average sSurplus% and bSurplus% of 
each session are used to run an ANOVA test.
Panel A of Table 4.6 shows that, as we expected, the combination of treatments No 
regulation-No oligopsony (pure competition) yields similar levels of sSurplus% and 
bSurplus%. Panel B of Table 4.6 confirms that the difference is not statistically significant. In 
comparison to the perfectly competitive treatment, Panel A of Table 4.6 shows that regulation 
increases sSurplus% (H3B), and slightly reduces bSurplus%. The mean difference between 
sSurplus% and bSurplus% is statistically significant in the presence of regulation. In contrast, 
from the perfectly competitive treatment a reduction in the number of buyers does not appear to 
change the level of bSurplus%, but does reduce the level of sSurplus%. The mean difference 
between sSurplus% and bSurplus% also becomes statistically significant with a reduction in the 
number of buyers.
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Table 4.5 The Effect of Regulation and Oligopsony on bWelfare
Panel A displays the effect of regulation on bWelfare in oligopsony and no-oligopsony 
settings. bWelfare is defined as the percentage of the competitive buyers’ surplus captured by 
buyers divided by market price efficiency. Panel B reports the two-tailed P-values of a 3-way 
ANOVA with repeated-measures on two factors (period and regulation). Panel C reports the 
two-tailed P-value of the contrast analysis (repeated-measures ANOVA with one treatment 
variable kept constant at the time).
3anel A: Plot of bWelfare
bWelfare
Regulation
"Oligopsony 
"No oligopsony
3anel B: Statistical Results from a Repeated-Measures ANOVA
Source DF SS MS F Value Prob > F
Oligopsony 1 0.0950 0.0950 5.30 0.0440
Cohort 10 0.1791 0.0179
Regulation 1 1.5728 1.5728 56.51 0.0001
01igopsony*Regulation 1 0.0321 0.0321 1.15 0.3083
Regulation*Cohort 10 0.2783 0.0278
Period 5 0.1198 0.0240 2.14 0.0756
01igopsony*Period 5 0.0537 0.0107 0.96 0.4509
Period*Cohort 50 0.5590 0.0112
Regulation*Period 5 0.0317 0.0063 0.30 0.9099
Regulation*01igopsony*Period 5 0.0981 0.0196
Regulation*Period*Cohort 50 1.0527 0.0211
143 4.0723
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Table 4.5 (Continued)
3anel C: Statistical Results from Contrast Analyses
Contrast F Value Prob > F
Effect of regulation 
without oligopsony 50.72 0.0008
Effect of regulation 
with oligopsony 23.19 0.0048
Effect of oligopsony 
with regulation 0.45 0.5158
Effect of oligopsony 
without regulation 4.34 0.0639
Table 4.6 Comparison of the Percentage of The Competitive Sellers’ Surplus Captured by 
Sellers (sSurplus%) and the Percentage of the Competitive Buyers’ Surplus 
Captured by Buyers (bSurplus%) Within Various Combinations of Treatments
Panel A displays comparisons of the sSurplus% and the bSurplus% for each cell of the 
experimental design. Panel B reports the two-tailed P-values of an ANOVA that assumes that 
each session provides a single independent observation.
3anel A: Graph of sSurplus% and bSurplus%
oligopsony oligopsony Oligopsony
■  sSurplus% 
HbSurplus%
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Table 4.6 (Continued)
5anel B: Statistical Results from an ANOVA
F Value Prob > F
Regulation-No oligopsony 
sSurplus% vs bSurplus% 120.3 0.0001
Regulation-oligopsony 
sSurplus% vs bSurplus% 36.68 0.0001
No regulation-no oligopsony 
sSurplus% vs bSurplus% 2.24 0.1653
No regulation-oligopsony 
sSurplus% vs bSurplus% 7.17 0.0232
It should be noted that the total surplus available to buyers is roughly twice the total 
surplus available to sellers (Figure 2.4). That explains why we can sometimes observe an 
important gain in sSurplus% and a small loss in bSurplus%, without any important change in 
the level of price efficiency.
4.3 The Effect of Regulation and Oligopsony on Market Price Stability and
Deviation
Price variance is used to measure price stability. The sample price variance is a measure 
of dispersion relative to the mean price. One price variance per session is computed over the 
last six periods of each session. Thus, 24 observations are available for the statistical analysis. 
Panel B of Table 4.7 is the result of a Two-Way ANOVA, while Panel C displays the results of 
paired t-tests and simple ANOVA.
From Panel A of Table 4.7 we can see that the presence of oligopsony increases the 
price variance, especially in the absence of regulation. On the other hand, regulation seems to 
reduce price variance a great deal when the number of buyers is reduced, and to slightly increase 
the price variance in the absence of oligopsony.
Although Panel B of Table 4.7 indicates that the oligopsony and the regulation effects 
are statistically significant, one has to be careful in the interpretation of these results; because the 
analysis also shows a strong interaction effect between oligopsony and regulation. The contrast 
analysis helps to shed some light on the results. From Panel C it can be seen that in the 
presence of regulation, oligopsony has no statistically significant effect on price variance. 
However, in the absence of regulation, oligopsony significandy (statistically) increases the price 
variance. Once again, regulation mitigates the effect of reducing the number of buyers. 
Similarly, the reduction of the price variance is statistically significant in a regulated world with 
the presence of oligopsony, in accordance with H5. In contrast, in the absence of oligopsony, 
regulation significantly (at the 0.08 level) increases price variance.
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Next, a coefficient of deviation to the predicted price is computed. The coefficient is 
computed as follow: Price deviation = (Pm -  Pp) where Pm is the market price and Pp is the 
predicted price. The greater the price deviation is, the further away the market price is from the 
theoretical prediction. The price deviation is computed for each period (excluding the practice 
round) of each session. For reasons enumerated earlier, only the last six periods of each 
session were kept for the following statistical analysis. In the regulated sessions, Pm = 495, 
while Pm = 400 for the unregulated ones.
Panel A of Table 4.8 shows that only in the absence of regulation and oligopsony does 
the market price come close to the predicted price (low price deviation). In an unregulated 
world, a reduction in the number of buyers increases the price deviation. The oligopsony 
treatment seems to have little effect in the presence of regulation. However, the price deviation 
level is high with regulation.
Table 4.7 The Effect of Regulation and Oligopsony on the Price Variance
Panel A displays the effect of regulation on the price variance in oligopsony and no­
oligopsony settings. The price variance is computed by session. Panel B reports the two-tailed 
P-values of a two-way ANOVA with one repeated-measures (regulation). Panel C reports the 
two-tailed P-value of the contrast analysis (simple ANOVA or paired t-test). __________
Panel A: Plot of Price Variance
Price variance
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Table 4.7 (Continued)
3anel B: Statistical Results from a Repeated-Measures ANOVA
Source DF SS MS F Value Prob > F
Oligopsony 1 7709915 7709915 19.31 0.0013
Cohort 10 3993524 399352.4
Regulation 1 3313482 3313482 7.90 0.0185
OHgopsony*Regulation 1 5449825 5449825 12.99 0.0048
Regulation*Cohort 10 4196359 419635.9
23 24663105
3anel C: Statistical Results from Contrast Analyses
Contrast F or t Value Prob > F or t
Effect of regulation 
without oligopsony t = 2.18 0.0800
Effect of regulation 
with oligopsony t = -3.26 0.0224
Effect of oligopsony 
with regulation F = 0.79 0.3946
Effect of oligopsony 
without regulation F = 18.78 0.0015
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Table 4.8 The Effect of Regulation and Oligopsony on price deviation
Panel A displays the effect of regulation on price deviation in oligopsony and no­
oligopsony settings. The price deviation is defined as square of the difference between the 
observed market price and die predicted market price. Panel B reports the two-tailed P-values 
of a 3-way ANOVA with repeated-measures on two factors (period and regulation). Panel C 
reports the two-tailed P-value of the contrast analysis (repeated-measures ANOVA with one 
treatment variable kept constant at the time).
Panel A: Plot of price deviation
3anel B: Statistical Results from a Repeated-Measures ANOVA
Source DF SS MS F Value Prob > F
Oligopsony 1 159441 159441 10.43 0.0090
Cohort 10 152813 15281
Regulation 1 17889 17889 0.54 0.4774
01igopsony*Regulation 1 121088 121088 3.69 0.0838
Regulation*Cohort 10 328367 32837
Period 5 38678 7736 1.58 0.1834
01igopsony*Period 5 42487 8497 1.73 0.1442
Period* Cohort 50 245091 4902
Regulation*Period 5 15964 3193 0.28 0.9207
Regulation*01igopsony*Period 5 50118 10024
Regulation*Period*Cohort 50 565781 11316
143 1737717
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Table 4.8 (Continued)
3anel C: Statistical Results from Contrast Analyses
Contrast F Value Prob > F
Effect of regulation 
without oligopsony 11.41 0.0197
Effect of regulation 
with oligopsony 0.41 0.5486
Effect of oligopsony 
with regulation 0.06 0.8162
Effect of oligopsony 
without regulation 11.17 0.0075
Panel B of Table 4.8 indicates that oligopsony increases price deviation in a statistically 
significant way, while regulation has no statistical significant effect. However, as for the 
variance, an interaction effect between regulation and oligopsony is detected. A look at the 
contrast analysis (Panel C, Table 4.8) demonstrates that in the absence of oligopsony, 
regulation significantly increases price deviation. However, with the presence of oligopsony, 
regulation has no statistically significant effect on price deviation. Similarly, in a regulated 
world, the presence or absence of oligopsony has no significant effect on price deviation. 
However, in an unregulated environment price deviation significantly increases when the 
number of sellers is reduced.
It appears that, in general, market prices do not converge to the theoretically predicted 
price. Our experimental representation of the model of pure competition is the exception, 
although we still on average have a difference of more than 20 francs with the predicted price. 
This raises two questions, are the prices converging to a different price than the predicted one, 
and are those prices higher or lower than the theoretical prediction.
A first step in answering the first question is to look at the relationship between price 
deviation and the price variance. The experiment average level of price deviation and of the 
variance is used as a benchmark. A high level of price deviation combined with a large variance 
indicates that market prices do not converge at all. In contrast, a low level of price deviation 
combined with a small variance indicates that market prices converge to the predicted price. 
Finally, a high level of price deviation and a small variance indicates a market price deviation, b 
ut not to the price predicted by theory.
Table 4.9 offers evidence that in the absence of regulation and oligopsony market prices 
converge near the theoretically predicted price. In contrast, without regulation and with the 
presence of oligopsony market prices do not appear to converge at all. In both regulatory cases 
(with and without oligopsony) evidence suggests that market prices are converging to a price 
that is not the theoretical predicted price. The average market price (Pm) suggests that the 
converging prices are lower than the predicted price (Pp).
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Table 4.9 Comparison of the Price Deviation and the Price Variance Across Treatment 
Combinations.
Pm Pp P deviation % Variance %
Regulation-No oligopsony 444 495 3077 1.08 373 0.45
Regulation-Oligopsony 445 495 3348 1.17 553 0.66
No regulation-Oligopsony 356 400 4477 1.57 2250 2.70
No regulation-No oligopsony 385 400 538 0.19 163 0.20
Overall Mean 2860 835
Where Pm = Average market price Pp = Predicted Price
Price deviation = (Pm-Pp)A2
Note: Price convergence has been computed using each individual observation, 
and not the mean prices
Although it is not in the scope of this paper, two puzzling observations are worth 
mentioning. First, prices tend to increase from period to period and then to drop to a low level, 
then they start to rise again, to eventually fall later. Some sessions have few long cycles, while 
other have numerous short cycles. A plausible explanation for the price cycles, which needs to 
be further explored outside the structure of this paper, is the Edgeworth cycle. The absence of a 
pure Nash strategy (for the buyers) and a capacity constraint (for the sellers) are the primary 
conditions needed for the Edgeworth cycle (Kruse, Rassenti, Reynolds, and Smith, 1994). 
These conditions, arguably, are present in this experiment.
Second, market prices are on average significantly lower than predicted. It should be 
remembered that sellers face advance production with no carry-over decisions in the experiment. 
In contrast, the theoretical price predictions generally assume production to demand decision. 
In the general setting, sellers only produce what they can sell (P=MC). In the setting of 
advance production with no carry-over, sellers face a much more complex decision. Sellers 
must make their decision before knowing the market price and are penalized for under 
producing (foregone profit), and for over producing (incur the cost of the unsold units). Are 
the differences observed the result of learning difficulties? A single-factor ANOVA between the 
sellers’ production decision over the twelve periods of the experiment and the last six periods 
shows no statistically significant differences (p-value 0.67). So, no learning effect in the 
production decision was detected over the 12 periods of the experiment.
Moreover, results indicate that in the sessions where sellers on average underproduced 
(from expected price=MC), the market price was still significantly lower than the predicted 
price, but higher than the average session market price. This seems to indicate that advance 
production with no carry-over leads to additional market power to buyers. Again, this needs to 
be further explored and is beyond the scope of this paper. It should also be noted that it is likely 
that without die 200 francs floor, the difference between the predicted price and the market price 
would be even more pronounced. The floor price was bid by at least one buyer 64 times over 
the 288 sessions that make up the experiment.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMOs) are the regulation that implements classified 
pricing and price pooling, which is a major part of the U.S. dairy policy. Twenty-four 
experimental sessions simulated the effect of the presence or the absence of classified pricing
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(FMMO regulation) combined with the presence or absence of oligopsony on various dependent 
variables. Perishability was also present in the experiment but kept constant across all sessions. 
The organization of sellers into producer cooperatives as an oligopsony counter measure is not 
taken into account as a possible treatment in the experiment.
Results indicate that regulation increases market price as well as the quantity traded. It 
also transfers market surplus from the buyers to the sellers. Hypotheses posed in Chapter II are 
supported or not supported as follows:
• HI a: Regulation increases market prices.
• supported
• Hlb: Regulation increases the quantity traded.
• supported
• Hlc: Regulation increases the percentage of the competitive sellers’ surplus captured
by sellers.
• supported
Results show that when the number of buyers is reduced from six to three (the number 
of sellers is kept constant at four), in the absence of regulation, buyers gain market power. The 
gain in market power is measured by a reduction in market price and quantity purchased. In 
addition, an increase in the percentage of the competitive buyers' surplus captured by buyers 
(bSurplus%), and a reduction in the percentage of the competitive sellers’ surplus captured by 
sellers (sSurplus%) is observed.
• H2a: A reduction in the number of buyers decreases market price
• supported
• H2b: A reduction in the number of buyers decreases the quantity traded
• observed but not statiscally supported
• H2c: A reduction in the number of buyers decreases the percentage of the
competitive sellers’ surplus captured by sellers
• supported
However, when regulation is present, a reduction in the number of buyers has no 
statistically significant effect. Thus, regulation successfully neutralized the oligopsony 
effects.
• H3a: Oligopsony has less effect on market prices with the presence of regulation
than without regulation.
• supported
• H3b: Oligopsony has less effect on the percentage of the competitive sellers’ surplus
captured by sellers with the presence of regulation than without regulation.
• supported
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Regulation has no statistically significant impact on market price efficiency, but 
increases market stability in a oligopsonistic market.
• H4: Regulation reduces the overall price efficiency of the market.
•  not supported
• H5: Regulation increases market price stability.
• supported
If the U.S. dairy sector is inherently oligopsonistic in the absence of regulation; results 
indicate that regulation can successfully obtain market results that conforms to those expected in 
perfect competition. However, the experiment does not explore the possibility that, if FMMOs 
were eliminated, producer marketing cooperatives might achieve a similar correction in market 
power between sellers and buyers. Neither does the experiment assess what would be an 
optimal level of regulation (differential). The possibility that regulation can transfer market 
surplus to sellers well beyond the perfectly competitive level has not been explored.
Across all the experimental treatments, market prices are significantly lower than the 
prices predicted by theory. The presence of advance production with no carry-over 
(perishability) in the experiment may explain much of this effect. Prior research (Mestelman 
and Welland, 1988) suggests that perishability disadvantages sellers. This hypothesis should 
be further explored. The presence of a floor price in the experiment is believed to have 
mitigated the decrease in market price and the market power of buyers. The floor price was bid 
in 64 periods over the 288 periods of the experiment.
Further research should explore the capability of cooperatives to correct possible 
oligopsony in the raw milk market. A critical issue is whether individual seller incentives would 
be consistent with maintaining a collective bargaining strategy among sellers. A better 
understanding of the market for raw milk could also be achieved by having perishability as a 
treatment in future experiments. Another promising avenue would be to explore if regulation 
reestablishes a market equilibrium close to the model of pure competition or if it transfers market 
surplus to sellers well beyond the perfectly competitive level, and how the magnitude of a price 
differential relates to this.
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APPENDIX A
Table A .l Instructions For Sellers With Regulation and No Oligopsony
In this experiment, you will participate in a series of market trading periods. As a 
participant in the experiment, you will be a seller. Transactions that you will make in each 
trading period will determine your earnings in "francs", a laboratory currency. Francs will be 
converted using the following formula, $=0.00075(francs), and will be paid to you at the end of 
the experiment. Each type of player has a different exchange rate. Your individual decisions 
will determine your individual earnings. Your earnings are not linked to the other participants’ 
earnings.
After reading the instructions, you will be given a chance to ask any questions you 
might have. Then we will begin the first trading period.
The chart below gives you the experiment sequence of actions
Sellers make 
a quantity decision
Type 1 buyers 
make a price and 
quantity decision
Collect the Hand back Collect the
information sheets information
Instructions for Sellers
Sellers earn money by selling units at prices that are above their costs. Total earnings 
for a period are computed by subtracting total production costs from total revenues. The 
information sheet gives sellers information on their costs. The cost of each unit will be the same 
in each period. Sellers must make production decisions prior to the start o f  
trading in each period and incur the cost of all units produced, whether or not 
they are sold.
Seller decisions and earnings will be recorded on a sheet similar to the Seller Decision 
Sheet, shown below. Trading periods are designated by separate columns. In this example, a 
seller may sell up to three units in each trading period. The production decisions are made by 
entering in the quantity row, prior to the start of trading in each period, how many units the 
seller wants to produce. The unit column gives the seller its production capacity.
Consider, for example, trades in period 1 of the seller decision sheet. In this case no 
more than three units can be produced. The first, second and third unit can be produced at a 
cost of 100, 110 and 120 francs, respectively (information sheet). Suppose a seller decides to 
produce 3 units, but sells only two units in period 1 at the weighted price of 180 francs (see 
Decision Sheet).
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Table A.l (Continued)
INFORMATION SHEET FOR SELLER: 1
Unit Produced Total Cost Marginal Cost Average Cost
0 0 0 0
1 100 100 100
2 210 110 105
3 330 120 110
A Sample Seller Information Sheet
DECISION SHEET FOR SELLER: ___ 1
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6
u n it
U n its  P ro d u c e d 3
Weighted price 180
U n its  so ld 2
1 selling price 180
2 selling price 180
3 selling price
A Samp
total revenue 360
total production cost 330
total earning 
for the period 30
cum ulative earnings 30
e Seller Decision Sheet
Total revenues are the unit sold multiplied by the weighted price (2*180), while total 
production costs are the sum of 100 + 110 + 120 (information sheet). Total earnings for the 
period would be 30 francs (360-330=30). Note that in this example, if the seller had produced 
2 units instead of 3 she would have made 150 francs instead of 30 francs. Earnings 
in this example are for illustrative purposes only; actual earnings might be higher or lower.
Importantly, a seller incurs the cost for all units produced. Thus, if a unit is produced 
but not sold in a period, that unit will negatively affect your earnings for the period. In the 
unlikely event that your cumulative earnings (bottom of the seller decision sheet) are negative in 
the last period, you then only receive your show-up fees.
Trading Rules
All buyers and sellers have identification numbers; your number is given in the upper 
part of a Decision Sheet that is in your folder. There are two types of buyers, Type I (low- 
value) and Type II (high-value), for which different trading rules apply, as explained below. 
First, the monitor will begin each trading period with an announcement that sellers have one 
minute to make their production decisions, which they will write on their Seller Decision Sheet, 
(quantity produced row) in the column for the current period. The production decisions of each 
seller will be collected by the monitor.
35
Table A.l (Continued)
Simultaneously, Type I buyers will be asked to write their bids and the number of units 
that they are willing to buy at their bid price. Remember that each buyer chooses only a single 
bid, so all transactions that a buyer makes in a period will be at the same price. That 
information will then be collected and the monitor will announce a minimum bid price at which 
Type II buyers can start to bid.
Third, Type II buyers will be given 1 minute to write their bids and the number of units 
that they are willing to buy at their bid price. That information will then be collected and the 
monitor will announce a weighted price (as defined below) at which sellers will sell.
Each buyer (Type I and Type II) must write down her respective bid and quantities (bid 
and quantity row, buyer's decision sheet).
Fourth, if supply is greater than demand, sellers will be selected randomly in the 
following way. Each seller has an identification number at the top of his or her Seller Decision 
Sheet. The monitor has Ping-Pong balls with seller identification numbers on them in a bingo 
cage that will be used to draw the balls in sequence (without replacement). Sellers will be 
selected in this way to establish a selling order. The monitor will then allocate the unit 
produced, following the selling order, on a highest bid basis among buyers. The first seller 
selected will sell his or her first unit produced, then the second seller selected will sell his or her 
first unit produced. When all first units are sold, the process will be repeated with second units 
produced. The process will continue until there are no more units demanded.
Note that all sellers get the same price for their units (a weighted price-) while buyers pay 
their individual bid. This completes the trading period. We will reopen the market for a new 
trading period by having sellers make new production decisions, buyers submit new prices and 
quantities, and the process will be repeated.
To summarize the sequence of trade:
1- Each seller makes a production decision
2- Each Type I buyer makes a price and quantity decision;
3- The monitor announces the minimum bid for Type II buyers;
4- Each Type II buyer makes a price and quantity decision under the minimum bid 
constraint
5- The monitor announces a weighted price;
6- Sellers sell their produced units at a weighted price.
(For example, suppose that there are two sellers, SI and S2, two Type I buyers B1 and B2, and 
two Type II buyers B3 and B4.
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Table A.l (Continued)
1 a- Sellers have 1 minute to make a production decision:
Say SI and S2 decide to produce 3 unit each.
b- Type I buyers have 1 min, to make price and quantity decisions:
B l and B2 submit bids o f 150 and 120 for 2 and 1 unit, respectively.
2- The monitor then announces a minimum bid for Type II buyers:
The minimum bid is the weighted average of the previous period realized transaction for  
low-value buyers plus a constant. In this case the minimum bid for the next period would be 
computed as follow ((150+150+120)/3 units + 100)=240, assuming that B1 and B2 bought all 
the units wanted. Where 100 (the constant), in the example, was arbitrarily picked by the 
monitor and kept constant over the experiment. For simplicity, let’s assume that the minimum 
bid from the previous period is 240francs as well.
3 -Type II buyers have 1 minute to make quantity and price decisions (price must be > or = to 
240).
Assume that B3 and B4 each bid a unit at the price o f 280 and 240, respectively. That 
would yield the following weighted price ((280+240+150+150+120)/5 units)=188.
4- The monitor announces a weighted price.
The weighted price is 188. Thus, the weighted price announced would be 188 in this 
example.
5- S upply is greater than demand: Sellers are randomly picked and sell their production at the 
weiehted price.
Suppose that S2 is selected first. The monitor will then allocate seller S2 first unit to 
buyer B3, and seller SI first unit to buyer B4. The monitor will then start allocating second 
units at the best available bid, so seller S2 second unit to buyer Bl, seller SI second unit to 
buyer Bl. Finally, seller S2 third unit is allocated to buyer B2. Because demand is satisfied, 
seller SI is left with a unit unsold. The blackboard would appear as follows:
Buyer Bl B2 B3 B4
To calculate their earnings, sellers use the weighted price, while buyers 
use their own bid.
The period ends and sellers and buyers are then given 1 minute to make production, bid and 
quantity decisions for the next period)
Except for interaction with the monitor, no other talking is permitted. Any questions?
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Table A.2 Instructions For Buyers With Regulation and No Oligopsony
In this experiment, you will participate in a series of market trading periods. As a 
participant in the experiment, you will be a buyer. Transactions that you will make in each 
trading period will determine your earnings in "francs", a laboratory currency. Francs will be 
converted using the following formula, $=0.00045(francs), and will be paid to you at the end of 
the experiment. Each type of player has a different exchange rate. Your individual decisions 
will determine your individual earnings. Your earnings are not linked to the other participants' 
eamings.
After reading the instructions, you will be given a chance to ask any questions you 
might have. Then we will begin the first trading period.
The chart below gives you the experiment sequence of actions
Sellers make 
a quantity decision
Type 1 buyers 
make a price and 
quantity decision
->
Monitor calculates 
min type II 
bid____________
Type 2 buyers — >
make a price and 
Quantity decision
Monitor allocates 
unit produced 
on a highest hid 
basis
Monitor calculates 
-->lthe final weighted price
Sellers enter the weighted 
— > price, and how many
units they sold_________
Buyers enter
how many units they
bought
Collect the Hand back Collect the
information sheets information
Instructions for Buyers
Buyers earn money by purchasing units at prices that are below their values. Eamings 
from the purchase of each unit are computed by taking the difference between the value of the 
units and the purchase price. Total eamings for the period are computed by adding up the 
eamings on all units purchased that period.
Buyer decisions and eamings will be recorded on a Buyer Decision Sheet, shown 
below. In this example, a buyer may purchase up to two units in each trading period. For the 
first unit that may be bought during a period, the buyer receives the amount listed in row 1, 
labeled “value of 1st unit.” If a second unit is purchased during the same period, the buyer 
receives the additional amount listed in row 3, labeled “value of 2nd unit.” Note that buyers can 
make only one bid per trading period, and if they trade, all the units bought in a period are 
purchased at their bid price.
Consider, for example, purchases in period 1 of the Buyer Decision Sheet. In this 
practice period, the value of the first unit is 200 and the value of the second unit is 180, as 
shown in rows 1 and 3. Suppose a buyer bids 150 for two units Eamings on the purchase of 
the first unit are obtained by subtracting the purchase price (bid), which is 150, from the value 
in row 1, which is 200. The difference of 50 is entered in row 2. Next, the eamings from the 
purchase of the second unit are entered in row 4. Total eamings for the period are the sum of 
50 (on the first unit purchased) and 30 (on second unit purchased). The sum of 80 francs is 
then entered in row 5. Eamings in this example are for illustrative purposes only; actual 
eamings could be higher or lower.
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Table A.2 (Continued)
BUYER DECISION SHEET FOR BUYER: B2
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6
Bid 150
unit 1 row Ouantitv 2
1st
unit
1 value of 1st unit 200 200
2 earnings 50
2nd
unit
3 value of 2nd unit 180 180
4 earnings 30
5 total earning 
for the Deriod 80
6 allocation plus 
cumulative earnings 80
A
Sample Buyer Decision Sheet
A buyer makes only one bid for the units he or she is willing to buy in a period, and 
does not receive the value for a unit unless the unit is purchased. Thus, earnings for each unit 
not purchased in a period are zero. At the end of a period, your earnings will be recorded in 
row 5 of your decision sheet. Earnings for subsequent periods will be calculated similarly. In 
the unlikely event that your cumulative earnings (bottom of the buyer decision sheet) are 
negative in the last period, you then only receive your show-up fees.
Trading Rules
All buyers and sellers have identification numbers; your number is given in the upper 
part of a Decision Sheet that is in your folder. There are two types of buyers, Type I (low- 
value) and Type II (high-value), for which different trading rules apply, as explained below. 
First, the monitor will begin each trading period with an announcement that sellers have one 
minute to make their production decisions, which they will write on their Seller Decision Sheet, 
(quantity produced row) in the column for the current period. The production decisions of each 
seller will be collected by the monitor.
Simultaneously, Type I buyers will be asked to write their bids and the number of units 
that they are willing to buy at their bid price. Remember that each buyer chooses only a single 
bid, so all transactions that a buyer makes in a period will be at the same price. That 
information will then be collected and the monitor will announce a minimum bid price at which 
Type II buyers can start to bid.
Third, Type II buyers will be given 1 minute to write their bids and the number of units 
that they are willing to buy at their bid price. That information will then be collected and the 
monitor will announce a weighted price (as defined below) at which sellers will sell.
Each buyer (Type I and Type II) must write down her respective bid and quantities (bid 
and quantity row, buyer's decision sheet).
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Table A.2 (Continued)
Fourth, if supply is greater than demand, sellers will be selected randomly in the 
following way. Each seller has an identification number at the top of his or her Seller Decision 
Sheet. The monitor has Ping-Pong balls with seller identification numbers on them in a bingo 
cage that will be used to draw the balls in sequence (without replacement). Sellers will be 
selected in this way to establish a selling order. The monitor will then allocate the unit 
produced, following the selling order, on a highest bid basis among buyers. The first seller 
selected will sell his or her first unit produced, then the second seller selected will sell his or her 
first unit produced. When all first units are sold, the process will be repeated with second units 
produced. The process will continue until there are no more units demanded.
Note that all sellers get the same price for their units fa weighted price) while buyers pay 
their individual bid. This completes the trading period. We will reopen the market for a new 
trading period by having sellers make new production decisions, buyers submit new prices and 
quantities, and the process will be repeated.
To summarize the sequence of trade:
1- Each seller makes a production decision
2- Each Type I buyer makes a price and quantity decision;
3- The monitor announces the minimum bid for Type II buyers;
4- Each Type II buyer makes a price and quantity decision under the minimum bid
constraint
5- The monitor announces a weighted price;
6- Sellers sell their produced units at a weighted price.
(For example, suppose that there are two sellers, SI and S2, two Type I  buyers B1 and B2, 
and two Type II buyers B3 and B4.
1 a- Sellers have I minute to make a production decision:
Say SI and S2 decide to produce 3 unit each.
b- Type I  buyers have 1 min, to make price and quantity decisions:
B1 and B2 submit bids o f 150 and 120 for 2 and 1 unit, respectively.
2- The monitor then announces a minimum bid for Type II buyers:
The minimum bid is the weighted average of the previous period realized transaction for  
low-value buyers plus a constant. In this case the minimum bid for the next period would be 
computed as follow ((150+150+120)/3 units + 100)=240, assuming that B1 and B2 bought all 
the units wanted. Where 100 (the constant), in the example, was arbitrarily picked by the 
monitor and kept constant over the experiment. For simplicity, let’s assume that the minimum 
bid from the previous period is 240francs as well.
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3- Type II buyers have 1 minute to make quantity and price decisions (price must be > or = to 
2401
Assume that B3 and B4 each bid a unit at the price o f 280 and 240, respectively. That 
would yield the following weighted price ((280+240+150+150+120)/5 units)=188.
4- The monitor announces a weighted price.
The weighted price is 188. Thus, the weighted price announced would be 188 in this 
example.
5- S upply is greater than demand: Sellers are randomly picked and sell their production at the 
weighted price.
Suppose that S2 is selected first. The monitor will then allocate seller S2 first unit to 
buyer B3, and seller SI first unit to buyer B4. The monitor will then start allocating second 
units at the best available bid, so seller S2 second unit to buyer Bl, seller SI second unit to 
buyer Bl. Finally, seller S2 third unit is allocated to buyer B2. Because demand is satisfied, 
seller SI is left with a unit unsold. The blackboard would appear as follows:
Buyer B l B2 B3 B4
Bid 150 120 280 240
Quantity 2 1 1 1
Weighted
Price
188
Seller S2 S2 S2 SI
Seller SI
To calculate their earnings, sellers use the weighted price, while buyers 
use their own bid.
The period ends and sellers and buyers are then given 1 minute to make production, bid and 
quantity decisions for the next period.)
Except for interaction with the monitor, no other talking is permitted. Any questions?
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Table A.3 Instructions for Sellers with Regulation and Oligopsony
In this experiment, you will participate in a series of market trading periods. As a 
participant in the experiment, you will be a seller. Transactions that you will make in each 
trading period will determine your earnings in "francs", a laboratory currency. Francs will be 
converted using the following formula, $=0,001 (francs), and will be paid to you at the end of 
the experiment. Each type of player has a different exchange rate. Your individual decisions 
will determine your individual earnings. Your earnings are not linked to the other participants’ 
earnings.
After reading the instructions, you will be given a chance to ask any questions you 
might have. Then we will begin the first trading period.
The chart below gives you the experiment sequence of actions
Monitor allocates 
unit produced 
on a highest bid 
basis
Sellers enter the weighted 
— > price, and how many 
units they sold
Monitor calculates 
--> the final weighted price
Buyers enter
how many units they
bought
Collect the Hand back Collect the
information sheets information
Instructions for Sellers
Sellers earn money by selling units at prices that are above their costs. Total earnings 
for a period are computed by subtracting total production costs from total revenues. The 
information sheet gives sellers information on their costs. The cost of each unit will be the same 
in each period. Sellers must make production decisions prior to the start o f  
trading in each period and incur the cost of all units produced, whether or not 
they are sold.
Seller decisions and earnings will be recorded on a sheet similar to the Seller Decision 
Sheet, shown below. Trading periods are designated by separate columns. In this example, a 
seller may sell up to three units in each trading period. The production decisions are made by 
entering in the quantity row, prior to the start of trading in each period, how many units the 
seller wants to produce. The unit column gives the seller its production capacity.
Consider, for example, trades in period 1 of the seller decision sheet. In this case no 
more than three units can be produced. The first, second and third unit can be produced at a 
cost of 100, 110 and 120 francs, respectively (information sheet). Suppose a seller decides to 
produce 3 units, but sells only two units in period 1 at the weighted price of 180 francs (see 
Decision Sheet).
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INFORMATION SHEET FOR SELLER: 1
Unit Produced Total Cost Marginal Cost Average Cost
0 0 0 0
1 100 100 100
2 210 110 105
3 330 120 110
A Sample Seller Information Sheet
DECISION SHEET FOR SELLER: 1
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6
unit
Units Produced 3
Weighted price 180
Units sold 2
1 selling price 180
2 selling price 180
3 selling price
total revenue 360
total production cost 330
total earning 
for the period 30
cumulative earnings 30
A Samp1e Seller Decision Sheet
Total revenues are the unit sold multiplied by the weighted price (2*180), while total 
production costs are the sum of 100 + 110 + 120 (information sheet). Total earnings for the 
period would be 30 francs (360-330=30). Note that in this example, if the seller had produced 
2 units instead of 3 she would have made 150 francs instead of 30 francs. Earnings in this 
example are for illustrative purposes only; actual earnings might be higher or lower.
Importantly, a seller incurs the cost for all units produced. Thus, if a unit is produced 
but not sold in a period, that unit will negatively affect your earnings for the period. In the 
unlikely event that your cumulative earnings (bottom of the seller decision sheet) are negative in 
the last period, you then only receive your show-up fees.
Trading Rules
All buyers and sellers have identification numbers; your number is given in the upper 
part of a Decision Sheet that is in your folder. There are two types of buyers, Type I (low- 
value) and Type II (high-value), for which different trading rules apply, as explained below. 
First, the monitor will begin each trading period with an announcement that sellers have one 
minute to make their production decisions, which they will write on their Seller Decision Sheet, 
(quantity produced row) in the column for the current period. The production decisions of each 
seller will be collected by the monitor.
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Simultaneously, Type I buyers will be asked to write their bids and the number of units 
that they are willing to buy at their bid price. Remember that each buyer chooses only a single 
bid, so all transactions that a buyer makes in a period will be at the same price. That 
information will then be collected and the monitor will announce a minimum bid price at which 
Type II buyers can start to bid.
Third, Type II buyers will be given 1 minute to write their bids and the number of units 
that they are willing to buy at their bid price. That information will then be collected and the 
monitor will announce a weighted price (as defined below) at which sellers will sell.
Each buyer (Type I and Type II) must write down her respective bid and quantities (bid 
and quantity row, buyer's decision sheet).
Fourth, if supply is greater than demand, sellers will be selected randomly in the 
following way. Each seller has an identification number at the top of his or her Seller Decision 
Sheet. The monitor has Ping-Pong balls with seller identification numbers on them in a bingo 
cage that will be used to draw the balls in sequence (without replacement). Sellers will be 
selected in this way to establish a selling order. The monitor will then allocate the unit 
produced, following the selling order, on a highest bid basis among buyers. The first seller 
selected will sell his or her first unit produced, then the second seller selected will sell his or her 
first unit produced. When all first units are sold, the process will be repeated with second units 
produced. The process will continue until there are no more units demanded.
Note that all sellers get the same price for their units (a weighted price) while buyers pav 
their individual bid. This completes the trading period. We will reopen the market for a new 
trading period by having sellers make new production decisions, buyers submit new prices and 
quantities, and the process will be repeated.
To summarize the sequence of trade:
1- Each seller makes a production decision
2- Each Type I buyer makes a price and quantity decision;
3- The monitor announces the minimum bid for Type II buyers;
4- Each Type II buyer makes a price and quantity decision under the bid constraint;
5- The monitor announces a weighted price;
6- Sellers sell their produced units at a weighted price.
(For example, suppose that there are two sellers, SI and S2, two Type I  buyers B l and B2, and 
two Type II buyers B3 and B4.
1 a- Sellers have 1 minute to make a production decision:
Say SI and S2 decide to produce 3 unit each.
b- Type I  buyers have 1 min, to make price and quantity decisions:
B l and B2 submit bids o f 150 and 120 for 2 and 1 unit, respectively.
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2- The monitor then announces a minimum bid for Type II buyers:
The minimum bid is the weighted average o f the previous period realized transaction for  
low-value buyers plus a constant. In this case the minimum bid for the next period would be 
computed as follow ((150+150+120)/3 units + I00)=240, assuming that B1 and B2 bought all 
the units wanted. Where 100 (the constant), in the example, was arbitrarily picked by the 
monitor and kept constant over the experiment. For simplicity, let’s assume that the minimum 
bid from the previous period is 240francs as well.
3- Type II buyers have 1 minute to make quantity and price decisions (price must be > or = to 
240).
Assume that B3 and B4 each bid a unit at the price o f 280 and 240, respectively. That 
would yield the following weighted price ((280+240+150+150+120)/5 units)=188.
4- The monitor announces a weiehted price.
The weighted price is 188. Thus, the weighted price announced would be 188 in this 
example.
5- S upplv is sreater than demand: Sellers are randomly picked and sell their production at the 
weishted price.
Suppose that S2 is selected first. The monitor will then allocate seller S2 first unit to 
buyer B3, and seller SI first unit to buyer B4. The monitor will then start allocating second 
units at the best available bid, so seller S2 second unit to buyer Bl, seller SI second unit to 
buyer Bl. Finally, seller S2 third unit is allocated to buyer B2. Because demand is satisfied, 
seller SI is left with a unit unsold. The blackboard would appear as follows:
Buyer Bl B2 B3 B4
Bid 150 120 280 240
Quantity 2 1 1 1
Weighted
Price
188
Seller S2 S2 S2 SI
Seller SI
To calculate their earnings, sellers use the weighted price, while buyers 
use their own bid.
The period ends and sellers and buyers are then given 1 minute to make production, bid and 
quantity decisions for the next period.
Except for interaction with the monitor, no other talking is permitted. Any questions?
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Table A.4 Instructions for Buyers with Regulation and Oligopsony
In this experiment, you will participate in a series of market trading periods. As a 
participant in the experiment, you will be a buyer. Transactions that you will make in each 
trading period will determine your earnings in "francs", a laboratory currency. Francs will be 
converted using the following formula, $=0.00015(francs), and will be paid to you at the end of 
the experiment. Each type of player has a different exchange rate. Your individual decisions 
will determine your individual earnings. Your earnings are not linked to the other participants' 
earnings. '
After reading the instructions, you will be given a chance to ask any questions you 
might have. Then we will begin the first trading period.
The chart below gives you the experiment sequence of actions
Seilers make \ J
a quantity decision-------------------------------------------------------------------->
Type 1 buyers 
make a price and 
quantity decision
Monitor calculates 
min type II 
bid____________
Type 2 buyers 
make a price and 
2uantity_decision<
Monitor allocates 
unit produced 
on a highest bid 
basis
Monitor calculates 
—> the final weighted price
Sellers enter the weighted 
— > price, and how many 
units they sold
Buyers enter
how many units they
hought
J
Collect the Hand back Collect the
information sheets information
Instructions for Buyers
Buyers earn money by purchasing units at prices that are below their values. Earnings 
from the purchase of each unit are computed by taking the difference between the value of the 
units and the purchase price. Total earnings for the period are computed by adding up the 
earnings on all units purchased that period.
Buyer decisions and earnings will be recorded on a Buyer Decision Sheet, shown 
below. In this example, a buyer may purchase up to two units in each trading period. For the 
first unit that may be bought during a period, the buyer receives the amount listed in row 1, 
labeled “value of 1st unit.” If a second unit is purchased during the same period, the buyer 
receives the additional amount listed in row 3, labeled “value of 2nd unit.” Note that buyers can 
make only one bid per trading period, and if they trade, all the units bought in a period are 
purchased at their bid price.
Consider, for example, purchases in period 1 of the Buyer Decision Sheet. In this 
practice period, the value of the first unit is 200 and the value of the second unit is 180, as 
shown in rows 1 and 3. Suppose a buyer bids 150 for two units Earnings on the purchase of 
the first unit are obtained by subtracting the purchase price (bid), which is 150, from the value 
in row 1, which is 200. The difference of 50 is entered in row 2. Next, the earnings from the 
purchase of the second unit are entered in row 4. Total earnings for the period are the sum of 
50 (on the first unit purchased) and 30 (on second unit purchased). The sum of 80 francs is 
then entered in row 5. Earnings in this example are for illustrative purposes only; actual 
earnings could be higher or lower.
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BUYER DECISION SHEET FOR BUYER: B 2
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6
B id 150
unit row Q u a n t i ty 2
1st
unit
1 value of 1st unit 200 200
2 earnings 50
2nd
unit
3 value o f 2nd unit 180 180
4 earnings 30
5 total earning 
for the period 80
6 allocation plus 
cumulative earnines 80
A
Sample Buyer Decision Sheet
A buyer makes only one bid for the units he or she is willing to buy in a period, and 
does not receive the value for a unit unless the unit is purchased. Thus, earnings for each unit 
not purchased in a period are zero. At the end of a period, your earnings will be recorded in 
row 5 of your decision sheet. Earnings for subsequent periods will be calculated similarly. In 
the unlikely event that your cumulative earnings (bottom of the buyer decision sheet) are 
negative in the last period, you then only receive your show-up fees.
Trading Rules
All buyers and sellers have identification numbers; your number is given in the upper 
part of a Decision Sheet that is in your folder. There are two types of buyers, Type I (low- 
value) and Type II (high-value), for which different trading rules apply, as explained below. 
First, the monitor will begin each trading period with an announcement that sellers have one 
minute to make their production decisions, which they will write on their Seller Decision Sheet, 
(quantity produced row) in the column for the current period. The production decisions of each 
seller will be collected by the monitor.
Simultaneously, Type I buyers will be asked to write their bids and the number of units 
that they are willing to buy at their bid price. Remember that each buyer chooses only a single 
bid, so all transactions that a buyer makes in a period will be at the same price. That 
information will then be collected and the monitor will announce a minimum bid price at which 
Type II buyers can start to bid.
Third, Type II buyers will be given 1 minute to write their bids and the number of units 
that they are willing to buy at their bid price. That information will then be collected and the 
monitor will announce a weighted price (as defined below) at which sellers will sell.
Each buyer (Type I and Type II) must write down her respective bid and quantities (bid 
and quantity row, buyer's decision sheet).
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Fourth, if supply is greater than demand, sellers will be selected randomly in the 
following way. Each seller has an identification number at the top of his or her Seller Decision 
Sheet. The monitor has Ping-Pong balls with seller identification numbers on them in a bingo 
cage that will be used to draw the balls in sequence (without replacement). Sellers will be 
selected in this way to establish a selling order. The monitor will then allocate the unit 
produced, following the selling order, on a highest bid basis among buyers. The first seller 
selected will sell his or her first unit produced, then the second seller selected will sell his or her 
first unit produced. When all first units are sold, the process will be repeated with second units 
produced. The process will continue until there are no more units demanded.
Note that all sellers get the same price for their units (a weighted price! while buyers pay 
their individual bid. This completes the trading period. We will reopen the market for a new 
trading period by having sellers make new production decisions, buyers submit new prices and 
quantities, and the process will be repeated.
To summarize the sequence of trade:
1- Each seller makes a production decision
2- Each Type I buyer makes a price and quantity decision;
3- The monitor announces the minimum bid for Type II buyers;
4- Each Type II buyer makes a price and quantity decision under the minimum bid 
constraint
5- The monitor announces a weighted price;
6- Sellers sell their produced units at a weighted price.
(For example, suppose that there are two sellers, SI and S2, two Type I buyers B l and B2, and 
two Type II buyers B3 and B4.
1 a- Sellers have 1 minute to make a production decision:
Say SI and S2 decide to produce 3 unit each.
b- Type I buyers have l min, to make price and quantity decisions:
B l and B2 submit bids o f 150 and 120 for 2 and 1 unit, respectively.
2- The monitor then announces a minimum bid for Type II buyers:
The minimum bid is the weighted average of the previous period realized transaction for  
low-value buyers plus a constant. In this case the minimum bid for the next period would be 
computed as follow ((150+150+120)/3 units + 100)=240, assuming that B l and B2 bought all 
the units wanted. Where 100 (the constant), in the example, was arbitrarily picked by the 
monitor and kept constant over the experiment. For simplicity, let’s assume that the minimum 
bid from the previous period is 240francs as well.
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3- Type II buyers have 1 minute to make quantity and price decisions (price must be > or = to 
240).
Assume that B3 and B4 each bid a unit at the price o f 280 and 240, respectively. That 
would yield the following weighted price ((280+240+150+150+120)/5 units)-188.
4- The monitor announces a weighted price.
The weighted price is 188. Thus, the weighted price announced would be 188 in this 
example.
5- S upply is greater than demand: Sellers are randomly picked and sell their production at the 
weighted price.
Suppose that S2 is selected first. The monitor will then allocate seller S2 first unit to 
buyer B3, and seller SI first unit to buyer B4. The monitor will then start allocating second 
units at the best available bid, so seller S2 second unit to buyer Bl, seller SI second unit to 
buyer Bl. Finally, seller S2 third unit is allocated to buyer B2. Because demand is satisfied, 
seller SI is left with a unit unsold. The blackboard would appear as follows:
Buyer Bl B2 B3 B4
Bid 150 120 280 240
Quantity 2 1 1 1
Weighted
Price
188
Seller S2 S2 S2 SI
Seller SI
To calculate their earnings, sellers use the weighted price, while buyers 
use their own bid.
The period ends and sellers and buyers are then given 1 minute to make production, bid and 
quantity decisions for the next period.)
Except for interaction with the monitor, no other talking is permitted. Any questions?
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